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Credit purchases of consumer goods are commonly made upon terms governed by an 
agreement between the lender and the seller. This type of purchase is generally subject to a 
legal principle of joint responsibility under which the lender and the seller are jointly liable 
to the consumer for breach of the sale contract by the seller. We study the rationale for this 
principle in situations where market failure arises because consumers underestimate the risk 
of product failure - for example due to seller misrepresentation - and it is difficult to enforce 
seller responsibility. We show that joint responsibility increases welfare and reduces the 
incentives of sellers to misrepresent the quality of their products. 
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When a consumer makes a purchase on credit she enters two contractual relationships:
the sale contract with the seller and the credit contract with the lender. An issue much debated
by policy makers is whether in the context of such credit purchases the lender should be jointly
liable with the seller for breach of the sale contract by the seller.
In most industrialized countries, including members of the EU and in the US, credit
purchases are regulated by a principle of joint responsibility (JR) whenever credit is advanced
by a lender pursuant to an agreement with the seller (referred to as ‘linked credit’). This is
the case for example when the seller and the lender are part of a joint venture or when the
seller acts as a credit intermediary.
2 Under JR, the seller and the lender are jointly liable to
the consumer for defective products or misrepresentation by the seller. Instead, when credit
is provided by a lender with no commercial links to the seller (referred to as ‘independent
credit’), the more usual regime of seller responsibility (SR) applies. Under SR, the seller is the
only party liable for breaching the sale contract.
The JR principle was ￿rst introduced in the UK by the Consumer Credit Act 1974. The
British example was then followed by other countries and its principles appear in the Federal
Trade Commission Holder Rule (1976) of the United States, and in the European Directive
EEC/102/87. The principle is currently being reviewed and discussed for the drafting of the
new European Directive.
3
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2 In some countries (e.g. the UK) credit-card agreements are also regulated by the joint-responsibility
principle.
3 In the proposal for a new Directive on consumer credit (COM/2002/443 ￿nal), currently under examina-
tion, art. 19 reads ￿The proposal is to adopt comprehensively the joint and several liability solution when the
credit supplier and the supplier of the goods or services are joint market operators￿.8
The reasoning behind the adoption of the JR principle in the UK can be found in the
Crowther Report
4. It is argued that JR can help to overcome the dif￿culties of enforcing seller
responsibility, which arise because litigation is costly and because the seller can go bankrupt
before the consumer is able to obtain redress. In particular the Report states (paras. 6.6.24):
￿If [...] the seller seeks to boost sales by making false representations, or supplies
good which are defective, is it right that the lender should be able to disclaim all
responsibility and insist on repayment of the loan being punctually maintained?
Wedonotthinkso. [...] wedonotconsiderthatitissuf￿cienttoleavetheborrower
with his remedy against the seller [...].
￿There are many reasons why in practice a legal right which the buyer may have
against the seller is not suf￿cient protection. [...] in some cases the seller’s
￿nancial position is so poor that it is doubtful whether he will be able to meet
the judgement even if the buyer is successful. The buyer’s dif￿culty in pursuing
a claim against the seller are enhanced if, whilst wrestling with the ￿nancial
problems of litigation, he has to go on paying the lender under the loan agreement.
Problems of this kind are particularly prevalent in relation to agreements for the
installation of central heating. There have been many cases where the supplier has
either not delivered at all or has provided an ineffective heating systems, and has
then gone into liquidation before the consumer has been able to obtain redress[...].
Empirical research con￿rms the concerns voiced in the Report. According to the Of￿ce
of Fair Trading (OFT, 2004), the largest cause of consumer complaints in the UK is ‘defective
products and substandard services’, which accounts for nearly 50% of the total complaints. In
about 20% of these cases, consumers encountered problems in obtaining adequate redress, or
there was an attempt by the seller to restrict his liability. In about 25% of cases, consumers
claimed that there was seller misrepresentation or lack of adequate information.
When the lender is jointly responsible for product failure and for misrepresentation by
the seller, consumer protection is increased for two main reasons. First, consumers who buy
through linked credit can use the deep pockets of the lender to obtain redress when the seller
has gone bankrupt. It has indeed been estimated that in the UK 95% by volume of the claims
under JR arise from the seller going out of business (OFT, 1995). Second, the consumers can
4 Report of the Committee on Consumer Credit, under the presidency of Lord Crowther, March 1971.9
withhold disputed repayments of the loan pending a ￿nal court decision, which saves them
some of the loss associated with an inef￿cient judicial system. This is particularly relevant in
countries like Italy where the duration of ordinary civil proceedings is 70% longer than the EU
average and where legal interest rates often fail to compensate consumers for such a long wait
(see Marchesi, 2003).
In this paper we investigate the desirability of the JR principle given the dif￿culties of
enforcing SR. We discuss the impact that the JR principle has on the incentives of sellers and
lenders to make linked-credit agreements, on the ef￿ciency of these agreements, and, crucially,
on social welfare.
We build a model with a monopolistic product market and a perfectly competitive credit
market. Consumers decide whether to buy one unit of product; they are risk neutral and
alike in their preferences. Depending on their initial endowment of wealth, two classes of
consumers are identi￿ed: the poor, who must borrow to ￿nance their purchases, and the rich,
who can buy for cash if they wish. Whether a consumer is rich or poor is unobservable and
borrowing is costly. Product failure occurs with positive probability and it is veri￿able ex post
but the seller escapes liability with positive probability. Credit supply can take two forms:
independent credit and linked credit. Under independent credit, the seller and the lender
operate independently and each maximizes its own pro￿t; under linked credit, they operate
as a joint venture and maximize joint pro￿ts. We derive endogenously the conditions under
which a linked-credit agreement is formed.
We focus on the possibility that consumers misperceive, and in particular underestimate,
the risk of product failure. This assumption can be justi￿ed on two separate grounds. First, as
weshowinthepaper, thesellerhasincentivestomanipulateconsumers’perceptionsofproduct
risk by misrepresenting the quality of his product. This possibility has also been suggested
by legal scholars (see e.g. Hanson and Kysar, 1999a) and by industry regulators (OFT,
1997); empirical research also con￿rms this prediction. Hanson and Kysar (1999b, 2000), for
example, provide evidence of misrepresentation in the food and pharmaceutical sectors, and
for products marketed as environmentally friendly.
5 They show that although consumers may
be aware of manipulative practices and approaches, they appear to be generally unaware of the
5 Examples include the case of Pizzeria Uno, an American restaurant chain, that advertised its thin crusty
pizza as ￿low fat￿ when in fact the pizza contained up to thirty-six grams of fat per serving, an amount well above
the Federal trade Commission guidelines for ￿low fat￿ (Whitt, 1997).10
extent to which those tactics succeed.
6 Second, an extensive literature in psychology shows
that people systematically underestimate the probability that adverse events will occur to them.
This ‘overoptimism’ is viewed as inherent to human nature and its pervasiveness is shown in
a relation to a wide range of events, including health risks, injuries in car accidents, mugging
and divorce. See for example Weinstein (1980), Perloff and Fetzer (1986), Baker and Emery
(1993), and Harris and Middleton (1994).
7 This exogenous view of consumer misperceptions
has been applied by economists and legal scholars to the study of market performance in a
number of ￿elds.
8 Mostly importantly in the present context, it has been used to support the
need for product-liability legislation; see for example the seminal papers by Spence (1977)
and Polinsky and Rogerson (1983). However, these studies have neither discussed lender
liability in the presence of consumer misperceptions nor have they endogenized the degree of
overoptimism by considering the incentives of the seller to misrepresent product risk.
We start by considering the benchmark case where consumers do not misperceive
product risk. We emphasize two points. First, with rational consumers linked-credit
agreements help to achieve market ef￿ciency. Through linked-credit the seller price
discriminates between the rich and the poor, which makes it pro￿table to induce poor
consumers to enter the market when their utility is positive. The idea that linked credit is
a price discrimination device was ￿rst proposed by Brennan, Maksimovic and Zechner (1988)
and it has recently found empirical support in Bertola, Hochguertel and Koeniger (2003).
9 The
second point that we emphasize is that when consumers do not misperceive the risk of product
6 A related paper is Boyer, Kihlstrom and Laffont (1984) who assume that sellers can engage in mislead-
ing advertising to raise consumers’ subjective probability of high product quality. Their paper investigates the
conditions on market characteristics under which misleading advertising arises.
7 The consent on consumers being inherently overoptimistic is however not unanimous and empirical justi-
￿cations supporting the opposite argument have also been provided (see e.g. Viscusi, 1996 and Schwarts, 1992).
We note that consumers often buy extended warranties (generally for their electronic appliances) that are typi-
cally overpriced. In these cases consumers would also appear to exhibit overpessimism rather than overoptimism.
In fact, the endogeneous view of overoptimism explains this only apparent contradition by pointing out that sell-
ers have incentives to undertake hard sale practices and make misleading claims in order to convince consumers
to overestimate the value of an extended warranty.
8 For example, Eisenberg (1995) points out how overoptimism by parties in a contract can explain why
courts do not always fully enforce contractual terms. De Meza and Suthey (1996) discuss how overoptimism
may explain the high failure rates of small businesses.
9 Alternative reasons for credit to be packaged with sales to consumers have also been suggested, including
promoting purchases and reducing transaction costs (e.g., Wertenbroch, 2003). The main insights of our paper
would continue to hold also under this alternative framework.11
failure there is no rationale for the JR principle. This is because JR yields the same level of
welfare as SR.
Compared to the above benchmark, we show that overoptimism about the probability
of product failure hurts consumers and bene￿ts the seller. By underestimating the risk of
product failure, consumers overestimate the expected value of the product and this enables the
seller to raise the price and appropriate a ‘misperception rent’. More importantly, linked-credit
agreements can now be welfare reducing. This can occur because through price discrimination
the seller may now induce entry from the poor when their utility is negative.
When we allow for overoptimism we also show that SR and JR are no longer equivalent:
under JR welfare is greater. This stems from the other facet of overoptimism: consumers
underestimate the value of the additional protection brought by JR because they underestimate
the risk of product failure. The additional protection brought by JR has then the effect of
reducing the misperception rent that the seller can extract out of consumer misperceptions.
This in turn has a positive effect on welfare for two reasons. First linked-credit agreement may
become again welfare enhancing. This is because it becomes less pro￿table for the seller to
use price discrimination to induce entry from the poor when their utility is negative. Second,
JR increases welfare also because it reduces the incentives of the seller to misrepresent the
quality of his products.
In most of the paper we assume that consumers are homogeneous and product failure
causes no other loss than the foregone bene￿t of consumption. For this case we show that JR
provides full protection and eliminates market failure. We then extend our analysis to the case
where product failure results in damages and to the case where consumers are heterogeneous.
We show that in these cases market failure is reduced by JR but not necessarily eliminated.
Overall, our results support the JR principle. If consumers do not suffer from
misperceptions, then JR is no worse than SR. But if misperceptions may indeed arise, then
JR is better. Legislation is then needed because JR reduces the pro￿tability of linked-credit
agreements and therefore it is a form of consumer protection that sellers and lenders have no
interest in offering voluntarily. Consistent with this result, we ￿nd that the JR principle has
been opposed by ￿nancial companies in various countries (see OFT, 1995).12
The desirability of lender liability for product failure is an issue almost unexplored by
the economics literature. One important exception is Iossa and Palumbo (2004) where we
consider a private-information setting in which lender liability is used as a device for signalling
the reliability of the seller. In that context, and contrary to the case analyzed here, the lender
undertakes liability for product failure voluntarily. In both contexts, JR is welfare enhancing
because of informational problems. A similar insight is informally discussed in Shavell
(1987). Lender liability has instead been extensively analyzed in the ￿eld of environmental
regulation where the lender can be liable for the environmental damage caused by the ￿rm
that it ￿nances. Pitchford (1995) and Boyer and Laffont (1997) show that full lender liability
can induce the ￿rm to underinvest in accident prevention and the lender to restrict lending. A
group of comments by Balkenborg (2001) and Lewis and Sappington (2001), and a reply by
Pitchford (2001) discuss respectively the role of the damage technology and of the distribution
of bargaining power in the 1995 paper by Pitchford.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the basic model.
We discuss the benchmark case of rational consumers in section 3, and analyze the effect of
overoptimism under SR and under JR in section 4. We study the incentives for linked credit in
section 5. In section 6 we endogenize the level of overoptimism by studying the incentives of
sellers to engage in misrepresentation. Section 7 discusses some extensions, while section 8
concludes. All proofs missing from the text are relegated to an appendix.
1.1 The basic model
We consider a perfectly competitive credit market and a monopolistic durable-product
market. In the product market, the product is produced at a constant marginal cost, for
simplicity normalized to zero, and it is offered for sale at a price p. A proportion d 2 (0;1] of




they attach value B > 0 to the good if it is not defective and zero otherwise. There are two
classes of consumers, the rich and the poor, all of whom are risk neutral; the size of each
class is given by nR and nP; respectively. Rich consumers have suf￿cient money to purchase
10 The term ￿defective￿ will be used throughout to represent also situations where the good is not delivered,
it is delivered with delay or it is not in conformity with the standards speci￿ed in the sale contract.13
the good for cash if they wish, whilst poor consumers must always resort to the credit market.
Class membership is unobservable. For simplicity, we assume that access to credit is unlimited
and that consumers never default on their loans.
The credit market faces a perfectly elastic supply of funds at an exogenously determined
interest rate, which we take as zero. However, the supply of loans entails positive transaction
costs t. The interest rate charged to consumers is denoted by i.
Credit supply can take two forms. A lender may operate independently of the seller and
due to perfect competition charge an interest rate satisfying ip = t. Alternatively, he may sign
an agreement with the seller in order to coordinate price and interest rate decisions. In this case
the seller and the lender act as a joint venture and share the same information. We shall refer to
the ￿rst scenario as ‘independent credit’ and to the second one as ‘linked credit’. We assume
that the seller is unable to sell on credit without the ￿nancial support of a lender. This seems
realistic: in practice sellers may be unable to offer credit directly for they lack the technology
to screen consumers appropriately and/or to diversify default risk. In any case, our results
would be qualitatively unchanged if we assumed that the seller could offer credit directly; in
this case, the linked-credit agreement of our model would simply represent a situation where
the seller is offering credit himself.
In practice linked credit and independent credit are different. Under linked credit, the
seller acts as an intermediary for the lender: he arranges credit for his customers and receives
the cash price directly from the lender. Thus, the consumer bears no expenditure at the time
of the purchase, that is, when the quality of the product is still unknown. Instead, under
independent credit, the lender hands over the cash to the consumer. The payment to the seller
is then made by the consumer at the time she makes the purchase.
We assume prohibitive transaction cost associated with the consumer proving to the
seller that she has received a loan from an independent lender and is indeed using that loan
to ￿nance her purchase. Thus, the seller is unable to observe whether a consumer obtained
credit from an independent lender or is using her own wealth to ￿nance her purchase. This
implies that the seller cannot price discriminate between the rich and the poor through the price
only. Our results would continue to hold if we assumed that the seller were able to distinguish
whether the consumer is using cash or independent credit, but were forced by law to charge a
uniform price.14
The liability regime depends on the form of credit. Under independent credit, the
consumerissubjecttoaregimeofsellerresponsibility(SR)whereonlythesellerisresponsible
for breach of the sale contract. Of course, SR also applies to cash purchases. We take a positive
approach to the liability legislation and assume that the legal liability of the seller is equal to
thecashpricep, whichthesellermustreturntotheconsumerupondiscoverythattheproductis
defective.
11 Furthermore, we assume that enforcing SR is dif￿cult, and this results in the seller
bearing only a proportion ￿ < 1 of his legal liability (or equivalently meeting his obligations
with probability ￿ < 1). There are various reasons why in practice sellers may evade their
responsibilities. First, judicial enforcement may be inef￿cient and result in lengthy trials or
long waiting times for trials to go before the court. In this case ￿ captures the possibility that
the legal interest rate fails to compensate the consumer for the wait. Second, the seller may go
out of business before the consumer obtains redress; here ￿ represents the likelihood that the
seller is still in business.
Instead, when the consumer ￿nances her purchase through credit provided by a linked
lender, joint responsibility (JR) applies: the lender becomes jointly liable with the seller for
product failure. Under JR, an aggrieved consumer acquires the right to stop repaying her loan
to the lender pending a court decision and if the product is discovered defective she does not
need to repay the lender . This simple fact implies that JR increases consumer protection since
it ensures that the consumer pays for the product only if it is not defective. Going back to
our previous examples, the consumer is not affected by the risk that the seller goes bankrupt
before he ful￿ls his obligations. Also, she does not suffer from the sluggishness of the judicial
system, for she keeps the money in her pocket during the dispute.
12
Let ui
h be a utility function representing consumers’ preferences, where i = S;J denotes
the liability regime and, with some abuse of notation, h = R;P indicates whether cash or
credit is used to purchase the good.
13 In light of the above discussion, and assuming a unitary
11 In a previous version we assumed that the liability of the seller was given by B: This had no effect on the
quality of our results.
12 Given our speci￿cation of the seller legal liability, JR also offers the advantage that it covers interest
repayments. While we recognize that this introduces an asymmetry into the model, the quality of our results
would not change if we assumed that the liability of the seller were equal to p(1 + i) rather than p:
13 The subscripts P and R re￿ect the fact that poor consumers must use credit and, as we shall see, in
equilibrium rich consumers always purchase on cash.15
discount factor, when the consumer purchases the good for cash, her (net) expected utility is
u
S
R (p) = (1 ￿ d)B ￿ (1 ￿ d￿)p (1)
while, if she obtains credit from an independent lender, her net surplus is
u
S
P (p;i) = (1 ￿ d)B ￿ (1 ￿ d￿)p ￿ ip (2)
Instead, when credit is provided by the linked lender, the consumer obtains
u
J
P (p;i) = (1 ￿ d)(B ￿ (1 + i)p) (3)
We assume that consumers are overoptimistic: either because it is in their nature or
because they are susceptible to seller’s manipulation, they underestimate the risk of product
failure. We also allow for the possibility, but this is not crucial in what follows, that consumers
overestimate the compensation they receive from the seller under SR (or the likelihood of
obtaining it). Up to Section 6 the degree of consumers optimism is treated as exogenous and
given by d￿ b d > 0 and ￿￿b ￿ ￿ 0, where b d and b ￿ denote the consumers’ beliefs about d and ￿:
We assume throughout that d￿￿ b db ￿ > 0 : misperception of the probability of product failure is
more severe than that of the likelihood of obtaining compensation. Consequently, consumers
underestimate the value of legal protection. This is the other facet of overoptimism, and, as we
shall see, it plays an important role in what follows.
Overoptimism implies that consumers have an incorrect perception of their surplus from
consumption. The ‘perceived (net) utilities’ corresponding to (1), (2), (3), are given by
b u
S
R (p) = (1 ￿ b d)B ￿ (1 ￿ b db ￿)p (4)
b u
S
P (p;i) = (1 ￿ b d)B ￿ (1 ￿ b db ￿)p ￿ ip (5)
b u
J
P (p;i) = (1 ￿ b d)(B ￿ (1 + i)p) (6)16
The unit pro￿t of the seller on those transactions where SR applies (i.e. either cash or
independent-credit transactions) is
!
S (p) = (1 ￿ d￿)p (7)
JR regulates linked-credit purchases. Under linked credit the seller and lender set the
price and the interest rate so as to maximize joint pro￿ts and then distribute these joint pro￿ts
between themselves through a monetary transfer. In our setting, the monopolistic seller has
all the bargaining power and therefore appropriates the entire surplus. The unit pro￿t that the
seller makes on a linked-credit purchase is therefore
￿
J (p;i) = p ￿ d(1 + i)p + ip ￿ t (8)
As a benchmark, consider the case where SR also applies to linked-credit purchases. In
this case, the unit pro￿t of the seller would be
￿
S (p;i) = p(1 ￿ d￿) + ip ￿ t (9)
Finally, whilethesurplusfromsellingtoaconsumerwhobuysforcashisalwayspositive
wR ￿ (1 ￿ d)B > 0
we assume that the surplus from selling to a consumer who buys on credit may be either
positive or negative, depending on the transaction cost of credit.
Assumption 1. (A1a): wP ￿ (1 ￿ d)B ￿ t > 0
(A1b): wP ￿ (1 ￿ d)B ￿ t < 0
Thus, under (A1a) welfare is maximized when both the rich and the poor purchase the product,
with the rich buying for cash and the poor on credit. Under (A1b), only cash transactions are




wRnR + wPnP if (A1a) holds
wRnR if (A1b) holds (10)17
1.2 Rational consumers and linked credit
This section brie￿y illustrates the benchmark where consumers are rational. We
highlight three things, which are important when considering the desirability of the JR
principle. First, linked credit is a device that makes it possible for the seller to price
discriminate between rich and poor consumers. Second, in the absence of overoptimism,
allowing for price discrimination, and thus for linked credit, is welfare enhancing. Third,
in the absence of overoptimism, SR and JR are equivalent.
To see this, consider the case where SR applies to linked credit. Under independent
credit, from (1) and (2), the reservation price of the rich is higher than that of the poor because
the poor can only buy on credit and credit costs ip = t. Since the seller cannot distinguish
between rich and poor consumers, he has two relevant options. Either he sets the price equal
to the reservation price of the rich and thus sells only to them, or he lowers the price up to
the reservation price of the poor, in which case he can serve the whole market. Let pS
R denote
the reservation price of the rich, that is pS
R solves: uS
R(pS
R) = 0, where uS
R(p) is given by (1).
Substituting for pS
R in (7) and multiplying the resulting expression for nR; the total pro￿t of
the seller when he chooses p = pS
R is given by wRnR: A similar procedure shows that the
total pro￿t of the seller when he chooses a price equal to the reservation price of the poor
is wP (nP + nR): Comparing wRnR with wP (nP + nR); it follows that under independent






wP (nP + nR) under (A1a) if wP (nP + nR) ￿ wRnR
wRnR under (A1a) if wP (nP + nR) ￿ wRnR
wRnR under (A1b)
(11)
With uniform monopoly pricing it can then occur that the pricing choice of the seller
results in market failure. In particular, this occurs when (A1a) holds but wP (nP + nR) ￿
wRnR : entry from the poor is ef￿cient from a welfare point of view but unpro￿table for the
seller. The seller sets the price equal to the reservation price of the rich, the poor do not buy
and market failure arises.
Linked credit can correct this inef￿ciency. This is because linked credit allows
coordination of price and interest rate decisions, which in turn allows the seller to price
discriminate between rich and poor consumers. By setting i = iS = 0 and p = pS
R; the seller
can induce rich and poor consumers to separate: the rich buy for cash whilst the poor buy on18
credit.
14 The seller can then extract the whole social surplus and earn pro￿ts wRnR + wPnP:




wRnR + wPnP under (A1a)
wRnR under (A1b) (12)
implying ￿S = W ￿ (from (10) and (12)). When consumers are rational, welfare is
maximized by allowing for linked credit and linked-credit agreements will always arise if
price discrimination is welfare enhancing, as is the case under (A1a).
In this setting, imposing JR on linked-credit agreements has no impact on welfare or
on the choice of the seller as to whether to make a linked-credit agreement. Since rational
consumers correctly assess the value of the additional protection that JR brings to them, the
seller can fully transfer the additional liability cost of the lender into a higher interest rate, and
thus replicate the equilibrium that arises under SR. In particular, under JR the seller charges
p = pS
R and then sets i = iJ where iJ is such that: uJ
P(pS
R;iJ) = 0, with uJ

















= 0; and ￿J = ￿S; where ￿J denotes the
seller’s pro￿t under JR. The consumers are as well off under JR as they are under SR, and so
is the seller.
We summarize the results of this section in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 When consumers are rational, linked-credit agreements have a positive impact
on welfare, and the joint responsibility principle is ineffective.
In the next section, we consider the case of consumer misperception. We de￿ne a
measure of the extent to which consumers can be harmed by their overoptimism, compared
to the benchmark of rational consumers. This measure will be useful to consider how
overoptimism affects the pricing behaviour of the seller and lender, and their incentives to
enter into a linked-credit agreement. We shall show that, contrary to the case of rational
consumers, linked-credit agreements can have a negative impact on welfare and thus reduce
market ef￿ciency.
14 Note that at p = pS







Overoptimistic consumers are lead by incorrect beliefs and this affects their willingness
to pay. A measure of the extent to which overoptimism can hurt consumers is given by the
differencebetweenperceivedandrealutility, asdenotedby￿ui
P ￿ b ui
P (:)￿ui
P (:)fori = S;J,
and ￿uS
R ￿ b uS
R (:) ￿ uS
R (:):








P = (d ￿ b d)B ￿ (d￿ ￿ b db ￿)p (14)
According to expression (13) under SR the effect of overoptimism is the same for
cash and credit consumers. This holds because credit consumers must repay their debt
to the lender regardless of whether the product is defective. Expression (14) captures the
effect of misperception on consumers’ willingness to pay. Since overoptimistic consumers
underestimate the risk of product failure, the ￿rst term in (14) is positive. The second term
is negative and represents the difference between the real and perceived value of consumer
protection, given the liability of the seller p. The difference between these two terms is non-
negative, i.e. ￿uS
P ￿ 0; for any price and interest rate that induce consumers to buy, that is for
any p and i such that b uS
P(p;i) ￿ 0. This can be easily seen by equating expression (5) to zero,
solve for p; and then substitute into (14) for the value of p thus found.
￿uS
P ￿ 0 implies that overoptimism increases the willingness to pay. Consumers can
suffer from their misperception because the seller can exploit their misperception in order to
charge a higher price.
Furthermore, the extent to which consumers can be hurt by their misperception, given
by ￿uS
P, decreases with the size of the seller liability. Indeed, it is easy to show that by
increasing the liability from p to L ￿ d￿b d




15;16 This is a crucial point: increasing protection when consumers are
15 Note that only if ￿ = b ￿ = 1 will L equate utilities across states (as in Spence, 1977; and Polinsky and
Rogerson, 1983). If b ￿ > ￿ the perceived utility in the bad state is greater than the real utility. Therefore, L must
be greater than the loss (B) suffered by consumers in the event of product failure.
16 Note that if d￿ were lower than b db ￿, consumers would overestimate protection and imposing a positive20
overoptimistic is always bene￿cial for consumers. This is because overoptimistic consumers
underestimate the value of the additional protection and therefore are not willing to fully pay
for it. Consequently, the seller cannot fully transfer the cost of an increase in liability into a
higher price (or interest rate).
Two considerations follow. First, our assumption that the legal liability of the seller is
given by p rather than L re￿ects the dif￿culty for policy makers in computing L because of
lack of information on the relevant parameters. Overoptimism would not be an issue if the
optimal level of liability could be placed upon the seller. The second and more important
consideration is that, since JR increases consumer protection, the extent to which consumers
can be hurt by their overoptimism is lower under JR than under SR. We emphasize this results
in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 ￿uS
P > ￿uJ
P for any p and i such that b ui
P (p;i) ￿ 0; i = S;J.
Lemma 1 follows by comparing (14) and ￿uJ
P where (from (3) and (6))
￿u
J
P = (d ￿ b d)(B ￿ p(1 + i)) (15)
which is positive for any feasible p and i (i.e. for any p and i such that b uJ
P(p;i) ￿ 0).
Intuitively, under JR the level of consumer protection is greater than under SR because
consumers are not affected by the possibility that the seller escapes his responsibility with
probability ￿: Indeed, by buying on credit and by being entitled not to repay the loan if
the product is defective, the consumer never pays for the product when it is defective. The
greater protection under JR, together with the fact that consumers are overoptimistic, implies
that consumers can never be worse off under JR than under SR, since they obtain additional
protection without fully paying for it.
In the following sections we show how overoptimism can yield market failure by
affecting the pricing behaviour of the seller and his incentives to make linked-credit
agreements. We shall then see how the result Lemma 1 implies that JR helps to reduce the
market failure.
1.4 Incentives to make linked-credit agreements
liability on the seller would not be optimal.21
1.4.1 Independent credit
Consider the case where consumers are overoptimistic and the seller operates in a regime
ofindependentcredit. Asinthecaseofrationalconsumers, underindependentcredit, theseller
has two relevant choices: either he sets the price equal to the reservation price of the rich and
sells only to them or he sets the price equal to the reservation price of the poor and sells to
both the rich and the poor. The difference with the case of rational consumers is that now the
reservation prices are calculated from the perceived utilities rather than from the real utilities.
In light of the above, let b pS
R denote the reservation price of the rich and b pS
P denote
the reservation price of the poor in the presence of overoptimism where b pS















= 0; and where b pS
P < b pS
R: If the seller sets
p = b pS















> 0: Compared to the case of rational consumers (expression (11)) we note
that, now, by charging the reservation price of the rich, the seller obtains greater pro￿ts. This






nR > 0; arises because overoptimism allows the
seller to charge a higher price, b pS
R > pS
R.
If instead the seller sets b pS












(nR + nP) (17)
and the misperception rent is given by ￿uS
R(b pS
P)(nR + nP) > 0:
For simplicity, in the rest of the paper we shall restrict our attention to the case where
￿(b pS
R) > ￿(b pS
P); so that under independent credit the seller prefers to set p = b pS
R and sell only
to the rich than to set b pS
P and sell to both the rich and the poor. Comparing (16) with (17), this

















P) > 0 since b pS
R > b pS
P: We shall discuss the case where (18) does not
hold at the end of section 5.22
In light of this, the level of welfare under independent credit is given by
W








From (19) and (10), when (A1a) holds under independent credit there is a welfare loss:
entry from the poor is ef￿cient from a welfare point of view but it does not occur because it
is unpro￿table for the seller. Instead, when (A1b) holds under independent credit welfare is
maximized: entry from the poor is inef￿cient from a welfare point of view and it does not
occur. In light of this, the next section analyzes the incentives of the seller to enter a linked-




Let us consider the case where SR applies to linked credit. As in the case of rational
consumers, linked credit allows the seller to price discriminate between the rich and the poor.
However, as we show below, contrary to the case of rational consumers linked credit may now
cause inef￿ciencies because of consumer overoptimism.
Under linked credit, the seller can perfectly price discriminate and induce entry from the












When (A1a) holds, this is pro￿table for the seller since entry from the poor generates a positive
surplus (wP > 0) which the seller can extract. In fact, the seller can now appropriate even more
than the whole social surplus because of the misperception rent that he can extract from both


















Under (A1b), entry from the poor is detrimental to welfare (wP < 0). However, because
of the misperception rent, inducing the poor to buy may now be pro￿table for the seller. In23
particular, when wP ￿ uS
R(b pS
R) > 0; the seller induces poor consumers to buy in spite of their
utility being negative.
Assuming w.l.g. that linked credit occurs only if the seller makes pro￿ts strictly greater
than under independent credit, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3 With seller responsibility, linked credit can have a positive or a negative impact
on welfare. In particular, under (A1a) linked credit is welfare enhancing, whilst under (A1b)





R) > 0 (21)
and has no effect otherwise.
Proposition 2 emphasizes the effect of linked credit in the presence of overoptimism
whenSRappliestolinked-creditagreements. Asinthecaseofrationalconsumers(Proposition
1), under SR, linked credit can be welfare enhancing. This occurs when (A1a) holds. However,
contrary to the case of rational consumers, under SR, linked credit can be socially harmful.
This occurs in case (A1b) when (21) holds. The reason why linked credit can reduce welfare
is that with overoptimism the seller manages to induce poor consumers to buy the product even
if their utility is a negative.
Denoting by W S the level of welfare under SR and taking into account the conditions







R;b iS) + uS
R(b pS
R)(nR + nP) = wRnR + wPnP under (A1a)
￿S(b pS
R;b iS) + uS
R(b pS










Comparing (22) with (10), and in light of Proposition 4, we obtain the following
corollary, which emphasizes the market inef￿ciency created by linked credit when consumer
are overoptimistic.
Corollary 4 With seller responsibility, a welfare loss arises when (A1b) and condition (21)
hold.24
1.4.2.2 Joint responsibility
We know from Lemma that JR reduces the extent to which overoptimism can hurt
consumers. We also know from Corollary 1 that under SR overoptimism can create market
failure. We now show that JR fully protects consumers from their overoptimism and it ensures
that overoptimism does not lead to market failure.
Proposition 5 Joint responsibility increases welfare when both (A1b) and condition (21) hold.
In the remaining cases joint responsibility has no impact on welfare.
Proposition stems for the fact that under JR consumer protection is greater than under
SR, which, as suggested in Lemma 1, implies that the consumer who bene￿ts from JR is better
off under JR than under SR. In fact JR ensures full consumer protection. This occurs because
under JR the consumer pays for the product only if the product is not defective, and thus
misperception over the probability that the product is defective does not matter. Because of
this the seller’s incentives to enter a linked-credit agreement are aligned with social-welfare
maximization: linked credit (and therefore entry from the poor) is pro￿table as well as socially
optimal if (A1a) holds, whilst it is neither pro￿table nor socially optimal if (A1b) holds. In
light of Proposition 2 and Corollary 1, this suggests that JR helps to correct the market failure
that arises under SR because of overoptimism, and therefore it increases welfare compared to
SR.
Formally, Proposition 3 stems from the fact that under JR, when (A1a) holds, the seller
maximizes his pro￿t by setting p and i such that (i) the perceived utility of consumers under
JR is zero and (ii) the poor buy on credit whilst the rich buy for cash. This leads to p = b pS
R and











Two things then follow. First, b uJ
P(b pS
R;b iJ) = 0 calls for p(1 + i) = B, which, from (3), ensures
that the real utility of the poor under JR is also zero: uJ
P(p;i) = 0 at p(1 + i) = B. This shows
that with JR the seller cannot extract any misperception rent out of those consumers who buy
the product under linked credit. Second, rich consumers are not protected by JR. This is
because the seller loses from JR, compared to SR, and thus he has incentives to dissuade them
from switching to credit. The seller achieves this by setting p = b pS
R and i =b iJ.25









R)]nR + wPnP (23)
Under (A1b), instead, the seller does not make a linked-credit agreement, since there is
no gain from using price discrimination to induce entry from the poor. This is because wP < 0
and the seller can no longer extract the misperception rent from those who buy on credit. It
follows that under (A1b) the seller’s pro￿t is given by (16).
Denoting by W J the level of welfare under JR and taking into account the conditions
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R)nR = wRnR under (A1b)
(24)
Comparing (22) with (24) yields Proposition 4. The corollary below then emphasizes another
important consequence of Proposition 4. We have seen that linked credit is a device through
which the seller price discriminates. We have also seen that price discrimination can be either
welfare enhancing (as in case (A1a) when consumers are rational) or welfare reducing (as in
case (A1b) when consumers are overoptimistic). The following corollary then emphasizes that
JR is also a device to ensure that price discrimination and therefore linked credit occurs only
when it is welfare enhancing.
Corollary 6 In the presence of overoptimism, joint responsibility helps to ensure that linked-
credit agreements are welfare enhancing.
Finally, since JR helps to protect consumers from their misperceptions and hurts the
seller it is clear that leaving the choice of the liability regime to the sellers or to the lenders
would not lead to ef￿cient self-regulation. Indeed, the following corollary provides a rationale
for the existing legislation on JR.
Corollary 7 With overoptimism, the seller and the lender would never offer joint
responsibility voluntarily.
Proof. See the appendix.26
Before concluding this section, recall that in section 5.1 we assumed that nR is
suf￿ciently high that, under (A1a), with independent credit the seller prefers to set the price
equal to the reservation price of the rich and sell only to them rather than lower the price and
serve the whole market. It should be apparent now that if we relaxed this assumption linked
credit would have no effect on welfare in case (A1a). However, Proposition 3, and Corollaries
1,2, and 3 would continue to hold.
1.5 Endogenous overoptimism: seller misrepresentation
Until now we have treated the degree of consumer overoptimism as exogenous. In this
section, we brie￿y relax this assumption and analyze the incentives of sellers to generate
overoptimism through misrepresentation. Seller misrepresentation is a well known concern
of legislators who have long since put in place legislation aimed at dealing with it. The
Misrepresentation Act 1967 in the UK and the fact that under JR the linked lender is also
liable for misrepresentation by the seller provide an example.
We assume that the seller chooses the level of misrepresentation before knowing
how a potential buyer would pay for the product. This seems realistic. We model seller
misrepresentation as the undertaking of unveri￿able actions (or the making of statements)
that affect consumers’ estimate of the probability of product failure b d so as to increase or
generate overoptimism. In particular, for any true probability d, the more the seller engages
in misrepresentation the lower is b d. For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we let
￿ = b ￿ = 0: Formally, let g(b d) denote the total cost (e.g. intensity of the hard-sale practice) for
the seller of inducing a level of misperception d￿ b d, with b d = [0;d]; we assume that g(d) = 0;
g0(b d) < 0; g00(b d) > 0, and lim
b d!0
g(b d) = 1:
17
In this setting, it is easy to show that, given the level of b d; the seller’s choice of p and i
still follows the analysis in section 5. Now consider the optimal choice of b d for the seller; the
following result is then obtained.
Proposition 8 The joint-responsibility principle lowers the incentives of the seller to
misrepresent product quality, which generates a non-negative impact on welfare.
17 An alternative modelling choice could be to assume that misrepresentation is veri￿able, although impre-
cisely and at some costs. In this case, g(b d) would represent the expected ￿ne incurred by the seller. We believe
that our simple formulation suf￿ces to to capture the idea that seller misrepresentation can be bene￿cial to the
seller for it generates overoptimism, but it is costly.27
Proof. See the appendix.
According to Proposition 4, the level of overoptimism under JR is lower than under SR,
because JR reduces the incentives of the seller to misrepresent product quality. This in turn
stems from the fact that JR decreases the misperception rent that the seller can extract out of
consumer overoptimism. Since engaging in misrepresentation constitutes a wasteful activity
from a social point of view, a lower level of misrepresentation raises welfare.
Note that this bene￿cial effect of JR does not affect the poor consumers only, but it
extends also to the rich who, as we have seen, always buy for cash. Since misrepresentation is
lowerunderJRthanunderSR,themisperceptionrentofthesellerissmaller, andallconsumers
are better off.
The results of this section show how JR is good for providing incentives to reduce seller
misrepresentation. This is important since previous results in the contest of environmental
regulation have suggested that lender liability may reduce the incentives of the seller to invest
in product care. In particular, Pitchford (1995) and Balkenborg (2001) have shown how the
effect of lender liability on incentives for product care depends on the distribution of the
bargaining power between the ￿rm and the lender. The distribution of bargaining power




In the basic model we have assumed that product failure causes no other loss to
consumers than the foregone bene￿t of consumption. In practice, however, product failure
may result in injuries or other types of damage. In this section we extend the basic model so
as to highlight how JR works in this case.
Assume that product failure in￿icts a loss D to the consumer and that the legal liability
of the seller is given by p + D, and let for simplicity restrict the attention to the case where
18 In particular, when the seller has all the bargaining power lender liability reduces the incentives for product
care. This is because the higher the liability cost of the lender when the accident occurs (and the ￿rm lacks
suf￿cient funding to compensate victims), the greater the compensating payment which the ￿rm will have to give
to the lender in the event of no accident. This implies that the ￿rm has less to gain from reducing d: Instead,
the choice of b d under JR does not depend on the distribution of the bargaining power between the lender and the
seller. This is because the endogenous variable is b d and not d; thus, it does not matter whether the transfer is paid
in the good or bad state.28
overoptimism is exogenous. Furthermore, suppose that ￿ ￿ ￿￿ where ￿ < 1 measures the
delays in judicial enforcement and ￿ < 1 is the probability that the seller is still in business at
the time the consumer seeks redress. Let b ￿ and b ￿ denote the consumers’ beliefs about ￿ and
￿; with b ￿ ￿ b ￿b ￿: Finally, assume that consumers underestimate the risk of seller bankruptcy
b ￿ > ￿; and overestimate judicial ef￿ciency b ￿ > ￿. Expression (1) becomes
u
S
R (p;D) = (1 ￿ d)B ￿ d(1 ￿ ￿￿)D ￿ (1 ￿ d￿￿)p (25)
re￿ecting the fact that under SR the consumer can recoup a fraction ￿ of the damage D (and
of the price) only if the seller is still in business.
When product failure causes damage, the effect of JR is twofold. As before, consumers
are allowed not to repay their debt when the good turns out to be defective. In addition, they
can ask the lender to pay D when the seller goes bankrupt. This yields
u
J
P (p;i;D) = (1 ￿ d)(B ￿ (1 + i)p) ￿ d(1 ￿ ￿)D (26)
However, now consumers need to obtain compensation for damages and therefore they
still suffer (although to a lesser extent) from the inef￿ciency of the judicial system and their
misperception of it (1 ￿ b ￿ > ￿). As Proposition 5 below highlights, this suggests that now JR
may not fully protect consumers.
Proposition 9 Let b ￿ 2 (￿;1] and ￿ < 1:When product failure entails damage, the joint-











Otherwise it has no effect on welfare.
Proof. See the appendix.
By introducing the deep pocket of the lender, JR protects consumers against the risk
of not obtaining compensation for damages when the seller goes bankrupt.
19 This bene￿ts
19 We have assumed that the lender remains in business with probability one. This assumption is meant
to capture the circumstance that ￿nancial institutions are subject to extensive and strict regulations. While not
making them immune from the risk of bankruptcy, regulation contributes to make ￿nancial ￿rms more long lived29
the consumers. However, since consumers still suffer from the inef￿ciency of the judicial
system, the seller can extract a misperception rent. This implies that JR reduces but does not
eliminate the inef￿ciency that can arise under SR, where negative-value trades may take place.
In particular, under (A1a), the joint-responsibility principle helps to redistribute the gains of
linked credit from the seller to the poor. However, the poor are not fully protected from their
misperceptions. Under (A1b), if the condition in Proposition 5 holds, the joint-responsibility
principle is welfare enhancing. Otherwise it has no effect on welfare.
From Proposition 5 we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 10 If b ￿ = ￿ = 1, joint responsibility fully protects poor consumers from
misperceptions, also when product failure entails damage.
Corollary 2 suggests that when the only factor that may prevent consumers from
obtaining redress is the possibility of seller bankruptcy, JR fully protect consumers from their
misperceive the probability of product failure. The assumption b ￿ = ￿ = 1 works well for




In this section we relax the assumption that consumers have homogeneous tastes.
Speci￿cally, we assume that the rich value the product BR > 0, while the poor value the
product BP > 0, with ￿B ￿ BR ￿ BP > 0.
We have seen that when consumers are rational and have homogeneous tastes, monopoly
pricing does not create a welfare loss: all and only trades with positive value take place
(Proposition 1). This is no longer true when consumers differ in their valuation of the
product because full price discrimination through credit subsidization is no longer feasible.
For suf￿ciently high ￿B or
nR
nP or for low wP; the seller may choose to supply only rich
consumers also under (A1a).
than their non ￿nancial counterparts. It is clear, however, that were we to assume a positive probability that the
lender goes out of business, JR would still protect consumers from the risk of seller bankruptcy, although not
fully so.30
What are the implications of this on the desirability of JR? As in the case of
homogeneous consumers, JR reduces the seller’s incentives to make linked-credit agreement
since it reduces the misperception rent. Consequently, when (A1b) holds, JR is still welfare
enhancing. However, it may now have a negative effect on welfare under (A1a). When (A1a)
holds it may be socially optimal to let the seller take advantage of consumer misperception
in order to mitigate the monopoly inef￿ciency. In this case, JR will continue to be desirable
provided that it does not prevent welfare-enhancing linked credit (and hence entry from the
poor) from taking place.
20 In the Appendix we show that a suf￿cient condition for this to occur
is
wP >
(1 ￿ b d)￿B




which always holds for ￿B and or for
nR
nP suf￿ciently low and/ or for wP suf￿ciently high.
1.7 Conclusions
We have studied the impact of a legal principle that makes the seller and the lender
jointly liable to the debtor for breach of the sale contract by the seller under linked credit. We
have shown that joint responsibility helps to correct the market failure that can arise because of
overoptimism and seller misrepresentation, and it helps to ensure that linked-credit agreements
are welfare enhancing. We have also shown that joint responsibility reduces the incentives of
sellers to engage in misrepresentation. The rationale for the legal principle stems from the
fact that joint responsibility reduces market failure due to overoptimism but it would not be
voluntarily offered.
We have ruled out the possibility that some consumers remain rational. Clearly, the
presence of rational consumers (the argument extends to overpessimism consumers) may
work as a protection device for the overoptimistic ones. Since rational consumers are willing
to pay less for the product than the overoptimistic ones, if the seller does not manage to
price discriminate between the different types of consumers, he might prefer to give up the
misperception rent in order to serve all types.
We have considered a situation where incentives to make linked-credit agreements stem
from the possibility to engage in price discrimination. However, there may be reasons other
20 This result is related to Polinsky and Rogerson (1983), who show that, in the presence of consumer mis-
perception, shifting liability form the seller to the consumers may help mitigate the inef￿ciency that results from
underprovision of output by a monopolistic seller.31
than price discrimination to justify linked credit. For example, coordination can be a way to
reduce the cost of lending, by using the facilities of the seller to supply credit (Wertenbroch,
2003). Someofourresultsextendtothissetting. Inparticular, jointresponsibilitywillstillhelp
to reduce the misperception rent of the seller and the incentives of the seller to misrepresent
the quality of its product.
Finally, we have assumed that the product market is monopolistic and capital market
is perfectly competitive. Our results do not extend to the case of perfect competition in
both markets. The reason is twofold. First, with competitive markets there is no scope for
price discrimination (and hence for linked credit).
21 Second, overoptimistic consumers would
perceive themselves as worse off under joint responsibility because perfect competition forces
sellers (lenders) to fully transfer the cost of additional liability into higher prices (interest
rates).
22 Therefore, linked credit would not arise in equilibrium. However, it is also the case
that under perfect competition sellers have no incentives to engage in costly misrepresentation,
and therefore overoptimism may not be an issue there.
21 Note that the discussion in Section 5 does not rely on the seller pricing behavior. Thus, also under perfect
competition in the product market, i) overoptimism hurts consumers (unless the seller liability is equal to L) and
ii) JR bene￿ts consumers by reducing the difference between their perceived and real utilities.
22 Indeed, Spence (1977) shows that under perfect competition the voluntary level of liability offered by
sellers is zero.Appendix
Proof. [Proof of Corollary 3] Under (A1a), the seller earns ￿J(b pS













the seller earns ￿S(b pS
R) under JR and max[￿S(b pS
R;b iS);￿S(b pS
R)]; under SR.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 4] From the analysis in section 5, when (A1a) holds, the seller
makes a linked-credit agreement under both SR and JR. Let b dS and b dJ be the level of b d that
maximize respectively ￿S(b pS
R;b iS) and ￿J(b pS
















implying d > b dJ > b dS: Thus, welfare increases under JR. When (A1b) holds, the seller may
make a linked-credit agreement under SR whilst he will never make it under JR. The effect of
JR on welfare then follows by noting that the level of b d that maximizes ￿S(b pS
R;b iS); as given
by expressions (16), is b d = b dJ > b dS.









P = (d ￿ b d)(B + D ￿ (1 + i)p) ￿ (d￿ ￿ b db ￿)D (28)
A comparison of (27) and (28) shows that Lemma still holds. However, ￿uJ
P > 0 for any
couple fi;pg such that b uJ
P (p;i;D) = (1 ￿ b d)(B ￿ (1 + i)p) ￿ b d(1 ￿ b ￿)D ￿ 0: Thus, JR
protects consumers but not fully so.
The optimal policy for the seller is to charge a price b pS
R such that b uS
R(b pS
R;D) = 0 where
b uS
R(p;D) = (1 ￿ b d)B ￿ b d(1 ￿ b ￿b ￿)D ￿ (1 ￿ b db ￿b ￿)p and to set the interest rate so that the
rich have nothing to gain from switching to credit. That is now b iJ solves: b uJ




R;D) = 0: This policy enables the seller to extract a misperception rent from the poor
given by ￿uJ
P(b iJ; b pS
R;D) (from (26)) where 0 < ￿uJ




Proof. [Heterogeneousconsumers]LetnowwR ￿ (1￿d)BR andwP ￿ (1￿d)BP￿t:Utilities
and pro￿ts are de￿ned as before, though we now use small letters to refer to reach consumers
and capital letters to refer to poor consumers. Let b pS
R : b uS
R(b pS
R) = 0 and b P S
P : b US
P(b P S
P;b iS) = 0
respectively denote the reservation prices of the rich and of the poor at i =b iS = 0. Under SR,


















where the left-hand side is the increase in pro￿t due to sales to the poor and the right-hand
side is the lost pro￿t on sales to the rich, and where b pS
R ￿ b P S
P =
(1￿b d)￿B
1￿b db ￿ > 0: Since full price
discrimination is not feasible, now the seller may prefer not to sell to the poor also when (A1a)
holds.
Now take JR. Under linked credit, the seller chooses the price and the interest rate













J) = 0 (30)
Condition (29) ensures that the rich do not switch to credit; condition (30) guarantees that
the poor are willing to buy. Note that for any pair fp;ig; we have b uJ
P (p;i) ￿ b UJ
P (p;i) =




J) = (1 ￿ b d)￿B
which requires b pJ = b P S
P: The interest rate iJ is then adjusted so that b UJ
P(b P S
P;b iJ) = 0. This
yields UJ
P(b P S
P;b iJ) = 0 and it implies that under JR linked credit never occurs under (A1b);
whilst under (A1a) it occurs if wPnP >
h
b pS
R ￿ b P S
P
i
(1 ￿ d￿)nR =
(1￿b d)￿B
1￿b db ￿ (1 ￿ d￿)nR which
is a suf￿cient condition for JR never to be welfare reducing.References
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